Emerging Risks in a World of Heterogeneity by Masayuki Tadokoro Susumu Egashira & Kazuya Yamamoto

Author:Masayuki Tadokoro, Susumu Egashira & Kazuya Yamamoto
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Springer Singapore, Singapore

5.3.3 A Dialogue or Negotiation?

On paper, the SII was “not a negotiation,” yet it differed in nature from the Structural Dialogue, similarly deemed not to be a formal negotiation. US representatives expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that those talks had not gone any further than an exchange of views. One of the joint chairs of the Initiative stated that the approach in the SII was a “clear departure from past practices,” and its purpose was designed “to be one not only of identifying problems, but most importantly, of accomplishing change through intensive sessions with the Japanese.”15 What was meant by a “clear departure” is made apparent by the following two points.

The first relates to a change in the US attitude concerning its demands. The USA, in the previous Structural Dialogue, had stated that the talks “were not a negotiation,” and, therefore, it would not submit a list of demands, instead making its demands known by its choice of questions and comments. In the SII, however, it produced a long and detailed list of 246 items across six different areas.16 When the SII became bogged down in the spring of 1990, the US side reduced this list to 18 priority items. This list was handed over to Japanese negotiators and the head of the Liberal Democratic Party.17 The SII went ahead, with the parties focusing on the items on these lists, while the Japanese side compiled a list of proposed reforms in response. The US team prepared a document that listed the Japanese proposals side by side with amendments suggested by the USA. The list of US demands was, therefore, not merely for show, but played a definite role in defining the exchanges.

The second difference relates to the documentation of agreements. The previous Structural Dialogue was never expected to produce an official report, but rather the aim was merely to reach agreement on the sort of language used to describe the dialogue in the US congressional briefing and press conferences.18 In contrast, it had been decided that the SII would ultimately produce a report outlining any agreements.

The report would be more than a mere gesture, largely due to the unofficial threat of invoking Super 301. While the SII was meant to take place outside of the Section 301 framework, in reality, the scheduling of Super 301 and the SII process were closely linked. Under Super 301, the second period of priority country designations was set for April 27, 1990.19 Meanwhile, five sets of official talks were scheduled to take place after the official start of the SII, with a final report to be released in June. In addition, an interim report emerging from the SII was scheduled to be released in April, just under 3 months prior to the end of 1 year’s worth of meetings and immediately prior to the second designation period of Super 301.

Thus, the interim report would be of critical importance. Initially, Japanese negotiators had stated that “as the final report will come out in the summer

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